Safe Science

Relational quantum mechanics is still a niche approach, but I bet it's the way of the future. It is conceptually fertile. It allows to define reality as the locus of intersubjective agreement (cf. mid p.4), so that different realities may correspond in different observer constituencies, e.g. homeopaths and non-homeopaths, and dreams are the ultimate instance, as Schopenhauer did not quite state, of a one-man reality. In this setting reproducibility, the core value of the scientific method, is a tool to extend agreement on a phenomenon to a larger community. The reproducibility of phenomena and the corresponding reality may vary in strength across communities, from extremely robust, Hiroshima-type, to exceedingly weak, as the results supporting theories regarded as pseudo-scientific usually are . Realities, i.e. loci of intersubjective agreement, may also expand and contract in time, as the history of science teaches us through such vivid examples as the rediscovered water-featuring M'pemba effect. This framework allows to identify the conditions and the obstacles, such as unwitting or wilful use of different standards and semantic models, that may affect reproducibility and hence the scientific validity of a result. Different questions eliciting different answers, as well as semantic equivalence in the eye of the experimenter, are important factors in the practical implementation of reproducibility (see [1] for a vivid example). The core question is no longer "Is this result reproducible?", but "By whom is it reproducible?".

It is often loudly claimed that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence". To me this is either meaningless crap or it boils down to building bias into the scientific method, where bias has no place. I suggest the following instead: "Extraordinary claims require REPRODUCIBLE evidence". Actually, all scientific claims require reproducible evidence. Or I won't believe them, that is. However, introducing double standards into the implementation of the scientific paradigm may be necessary to maintain the scientific status of "big science" projects, which relie on massive "a posteriori" data-filtering (see e.g. how they "modify things a bit" at CERN) and are so costly that they results can hardly be reproduced by uninvolved observers. The introduction of a separate status for "extraordinary" (i.e. non-mainstream) claims allows mainstream science to protect itself by introducing a separate set of rules. Such double standards allow the liquidation of outsiders' claims, without impacting mainstream research, safeguarding its considerable network of economic interests and, perhaps most importantly, its status of ideological flagship.

LIS for Persian nukes

Iran's nuclear program hits the headlines these days, but there is no answer to the crucial question. How far are they from a working nuke?
Everyone who's got Khan's blueprint (which is almost freely available, beside having been presented to the Iranians by its author) can easily build a nuke if he's got enough U-235. With enough reasonably pure U-235 building a nuke is quite easy anyways. So the question is, how long do they need to produce pure-enough U-235 in reasonable multiples of 20kg ?
If they are trying to get there the standard centrifuge-based way, they are at least several years off. They will have to build or obtain thousands of new centrifuges. Then they'll have to operate them for years. It's a complex, costly and very energy intensive operation. Besides, the specifics of the uranium mineral from Iranian mines may require tricky modifications to the standard technology, which may slow down progress substantially, unless they manage to buy better mineral from abroad, which is unlikely. Anyways, even without the latter complication, centrifuge-based uranium enrichment is a large-scale project that cannot be kept secret and is highly vulnerable. There is plenty of time there.

Is that all?
No.
The Iranians claim they have disbanded their laser isotope separation (LIS) project in 2003. LIS is quite high-tech stuff, but it can be implemented as a small-scale operation yielding relevant amounts of U-235 of excellent purity. If you want to hide and are smart enough to master the technology, that's the way to go.
So the key question, as I see it, is now the following. Was the Lashkar Abad LIS pilot facility really dismantled or was it just moved underground?

On the other hand, if, as widely claimed, LIS is really too difficult to be within Iran's technological reach, I surmise that we can sleep peacefully.

IV